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RESPONSE
TO DAVID NIMMER
Martha Woodmansee*
The Qimron 1 decision that is the subject of David Nimmer's
essay2 derives much of its force from its deployment of a rhetoric
of entitlement that I have termed the rhetoric of "Romantic
authorship" in recognition of its source in early nineteenthcentury European cultural history. 3 In its deliberations, the
Israeli Supreme Court determined that Qimron put an
extraordinary amount of work into deciphering and
reconstructing the ancient text in question. 4 Then it set about
determining whether the work involved amounted only to "sweat
of the brow" or rose to genuinely creative "authorial" work. The
court writes:
Examination of the work, on all of its levels as a complete
single work shows originality and creativity that are
undoubtable. Qimron's work was not, therefore, technical
work, "mechanical," like simple manual labor the results of
which are known in advance. His "inspiration," the "added
soul" that he gave to the Scroll fragments, that transfigured

* Professor of English, Case Western Reserve University. The "author"
acknowledges with gratitude the decade-long collaboration with Peter Jaszi that has
nourished these comments.
1.
C.A. 2790/93, 2811/93, Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. 817.
2.
David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality,
38 Hous. L. REV. 1, 101 (2001).
3.
See generally Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic
and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author,' 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD.
425, 425-48 (1984) [hereinafter Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright]; MARTHA
WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF
AESTHETICS 36 (1994) [hereinafter WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET];
Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction to THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP:
TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 1, 2-3 (Peter Jaszi & Martha
Woodmansee eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP].
4.
Qimron, 54(3) P.D. at para. 14.
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the fragments into a living text, were not only confined to
the investment of human resources, like "sweat," in the
sense of "The sweat of man's brows." These were the fruits
of a process in which Qimron used his knowledge, expertise
and imagination, exercised judgment and chose between
5
different alternatives.
One of the unexpected pleasures of being in literary studies
has involved participating in the dismantling of this opposition
between "sweat of the brow" and truly creative "authorial" work.
The conclusion that my discipline has reached over the past
thirty years is that the distinction is specious-that it is
arbitrary and frequently a source of serious harm. Empirical
research into the nature of composition, and creative production
generally, has shown that we are always already cutting and
pasting; 6 and historical research has shown that the inclination
to represent some creative productions as somehow more truly
creative is rather recent. Not until the end of the eighteenth
century do we find poets, publishers, and parliamentarians
insisting on the originality of (some) creative work. The impetus
for this Romantic (mis)representation of creative activity was the
expansion-the first big expansion-in the market for printed
books. In an effort to achieve visibility in a growing sea of printed
matter, creative producers began to insist on the originality of
their work: "My work is innovative; yours is merely hackwork."7
The arbitrary distinction between "sweat of the brow" and
truly creative "authorial" work is the basis for the court's decision
in Qimron, and the court empowers its decision rhetorically by
invoking some of the more archaic tropes of this Romantic
model-for example, when it notes in the passage quoted above
that Qimron's reconstruction of the ancient text exhibited the
requisite "originality and creativity" to lift it out of the sphere of
"sweat of the brow" into that of genuine authorship because, by
the "force of his work" in reconstructing and deciphering the

5.

ld.

6.
See, e.g., ANDREA LUNSFORD & LISA EDE, SINGULAR TEXTS/PLURAL AUTHORS:
PERSPECTIVES ON COLLABORATIVE WRITING (1990).
7.
See Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright, supra note 3; WOODMANSEE,
THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET, supra note 3, at 50-51; Martha Woodmansee, On
the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra
note 3, at 15-28; Martha Woodmansee, The Cultural Work of Copyright: Legislating
Authorship in Britain, 1837-1842, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 65, 65-96 (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of"Authorship," 1991 Duke L.J. 455, 471, 475; Peter Jaszi, On the Author
Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORSHIP, supra note 3, at 29, 29-56; see also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:
THE INvENTION OF COPYRIGHT 2, 6 (1993).
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fragments, Qimron "inspired," or "imbued" them with "soul," and
thereby "transfigured the fragments into a living text." 8 In this
turn of phrase the court is casting Qimron's effort as one of
giving new life and casting the creation of life not in terms of
gestation in a woman's womb, but in masculine terms of
insemination. 9
The archaic-indeed, deeply patriarchal-roots of this way of
representing the creative activities of Qimron surface even more
vividly when the court turns from his economic rights to his
moral rights. In the introduction to their purloined edition of the
ancient text at issue, it will be recalled that Shanks and the
other editors did not credit Qimron for the reconstruction they
reproduced. 10 In the eyes of the court this is tantamount to a
denial of Qimron's paternity. Figuring the deciphered text as his
offspring, the court writes:
A man is entitled to have his name applied to the
"children of his spirit." His spiritual connection to these is
like, almost, his connection to those who come forth from
his loins. Publication of a work without its being attributed
to the name of its author "in the accepted manner and to
the accepted extent" is a violation of the author's moral
. ht .11
ng
Such rhetoric produces-it empowers-the wrong decision, for it
locks up, as the property of a single scholar, a text of
extraordinary historical and religious significance that should be
made widely available. In this I agree with Nimmer, but I cannot
agree with the means by which he proposes to achieve a better
outcome.
Nimmer believes that a better outcome will be achieved in
Qimron if we simply attend to the plaintiffs intentions: Qimron
intended to reconstruct with the greatest possible accuracy the
meaning of an ancient author, not himself to author-to express
his own subjectivity. In proposing his "rule of intentionality,"
however, Nimmer's aim is more ambitious than just to secure a
different, better outcome in Qimron. He seeks thereby to
articulate an autonomous, neutral principle-copyright
principles generally-that will be independent of, and thus not
8.
Qimron, 54(3) P.D. at para. 14.
9.
On the gendering of creative production, see generally Richard G. Swartz,
Patrimony and the Figuration of Authorship in the Eighteenth-Century Literary Property
Debates, in 7 WORKS AND DAYS 29-54 (1989); CHRISTINE BATTERSBY, GENDER AND
GENIUS: TOWARDS A FEMINIST AESTHETICS (1989).

10. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. at para. 20 ("Appellants published the Deciphered Text in its
entirety, without noting Qimron's name .... ").
11. Id. at para. 23.
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vulnerable to, criticism from outside the law, and in particular
from literary criticism.
In the rule of intentionality Nimmer believes that he has
found such a principle. I disagree. My aim in these brief
comments is to reassert the relevance of literary criticism in
contemporary copyright discourse. The enormous number of
literary scholars Nimmer quotes in his running assault on
literary theory makes it easy to lose sight of what has been the
central insight of literary theory as it has been applied to
copyright over the last decade, and that is that the vision of
authorship at the center of this body of law operates to obscure
the complexity of creative activity-to impede arbitrarily and
mischievously our ability to understand whose contributions to a
given cultural production can and should be recognized in
disputes. I believe that this holds equally true of Nimmer's
principle of -intentionality. It does not succeed in escaping the
force field of Romantic authorship. It may produce a more
reasonable result in Qimron, but when we apply it in other
contexts I believe we will see that it is not a neutral principle
after all, but really just a strategic redeployment of the
authorship test, and, accordingly, produces pretty much the same
results as the vision of creative production that we have
inherited from the nineteenth century. If I am right, I feel I will
have defended the continuing relevance of literary studies in the
discourse of copyright.
Take the recent case of Aalmuhammed v. Lee 12 in which the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adjudicated a claim to
joint authorship in the making of the movie, Malcolm X. 13
Nimmer's intentionality rule is actually applied in this case, with
the consequence that the exclusive copyright of Warner Brothers
14
is affirmed at the expense of a plaintiff whose contribution to
the making of the film is agreed by all parties to have been
"extensive. "15
It seems that the plaintiff, Aalmuhammed, reviewed the
shooting script, suggesting revisions-many of which were shot
and some of which were included in the film ultimately
released-and that he wrote entire scenes enacted in the film. 16
An expert on Islam and the life of Malcolm X, Aalmuhammed
had himself "previously written, directed, and produced a
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1229, 1231.
Id. at 1229-30.
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documentary film about Malcolm X."17 In addition to clearly
copyrightable contributions, Aalmuhammed made other
"substantial and valuable contributions to the movie,"18 according
to the court, including "direct[ing] Denzel Washington and other
actors while on the set, ... translat[ing] Arabic into English for
subtitles, supply[ing] his own voice for voice-overs, select[ing] the
proper prayers and religious practices for the characters, and
edit[ing] parts ofthe movie during post production."19
Substantial as this (partial) list of contributions may seem,
it did not add up to co-authorship in the eyes of the court:
Aalmuhammed did not at any time have superintendence of
the work. Warner Brothers and Spike Lee controlled it.
Aalmuhammed was not the person "who . . . actually
formed the picture by putting the persons in position, and
arranging the place .... " Spike Lee was, so far as we can
tell from the record. Aalmuhammed. . . could make
extremely helpful recommendations, but Spike Lee was not
bound to accept any of them, and the work would not
benefit in the slightest unless Spike Lee chose to accept
them. Aalmuhammed lacked control over the work, and
absence of control is strong evidence of the absence of
coauthorship. 20
Moreover-and apparently decisive-we are told that Warner
Brothers could not "logically" have "intended to share ownership
with individuals like Aalmuhammed" when it even required
21
director Spike Lee to sign a "'work for hire"' agreement.
We may or may not agree with the court's decision in
Aalmuhammed. My point is not that Aalmuhammed deserved a
larger share of recognition and profit than he received, although
it seems that a case could be made for it. The point is rather that
meaningful deliberation about whose contributions can: and
ought to be recognized has been foreclosed upon prematurely by
the court's application of the intentionality test. The only way the
intentionality principle can deal with Aalmuhammed is to erase
him. This the principle shares with our standard authorship
tests.
In other situations, application of the intentionality principle
goes farther-producing clearly undesirable results. Consider the
case of the Aboriginal artist whose design is reproduced without

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1229.
at 1231.
at 1230.
at 1235 (footnotes omitted).
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authorization by a carpet or T-shirt manufacturer. 22 Fortunately,
as I believe Nimmer would agree, cases like this are more and
more frequently being decided in favor of the Aboriginal artists.
But it is not clear that this would be the outcome if Australian
courts applied the intentionality rule he is proposing. Could we
say that the artists who created these designs intended to
function as authors-to imbue the designs with their own
subjectivity? Consciously? Even unconsciously? It is unlikely that
they would describe their activity in this way, or, indeed, even
accept such a description of it. That is because, like Qimron, they
view the activity in which they are involved as one rather of
transmission-transmission of the meanings of their forebears.
Application of the intentionality rule would thus deny copyright
to these creative producers-in the same way as have our
standard authorship tests. 23
David Nimmer's proposal would not, then, seem to advance
the cause of more reasonable decisions. It seems, rather, to
produce pretty much the same predictable winners and losers as
does the traditional authorship test-which it extends the reach
of. Like this test, it mystifies-it simplifies complex creative
processes, obscuring understanding of whose contributions can
and should be recognized.

22.
See Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles PTY Ltd. 157 A.L.R. 193, 195, 211-12 (1998)
(fincling that the copyright owner of an artistic work has a fiduciary obligation to enforce
the copyright); Milpurrurru v. lndofurn (1994) 30 I.P.R. 209 (holding that the carpet
manufacturer infringed the copyrights of the Aboriginal artists by reproducing their
artwork without license).
23.
See generally Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, The Ethical Reaches of
Authorship, 95 S. ATLANTIC Q. 947 (1996).

